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SUMMARIES 
Giuseppe Peano's development of the real number system 
from his postulates for the natural numbers and some of 
his views on definitions in mathematics are presented in 
order to clarify his concept of number. They show that 
his use of the axiomatic method was intended to make 
mathematical theory clearer, more precise, and easier to 
learn. They further reveal some of his reasons for not 
accepting the contemporary "philosophies" of logicism and 
formalism, thus showing that he never tried to found 
mathematics on anything beyond our experience of the 
material world. 
Lo sviluppo dei numeri reali dai numeri naturali di 
Giuseppe Peano 2 qui tracciato, ed alcune sue vedute 
sulle definizioni matematiche sono presentate allo scope 
di chiarire il suo concetto di numero. Esse dimostrano 
ch'egli adoperb il metodo assiomatico a fin di rendere 
la teoria della matematica piti chiara, pi2 precisa e pia 
facile ad imparare. Esse rivelano, inoltre, alcune sue 
ragioni per non accettare le "filosofie" contemporanee 
de1 logicismo e de1 formalismo. Cosi b dimostrato 
ch'egli non ha mai cercato di fondare la sua teoria mate- 
matica su altro the la nostra esperienza de1 mondo 
materiale. 
Pa3BHTHe CPiCTeMhI JJeifCTBHTeJIbHbIX VHCeJI OT 
HaTypaJlbHUX YHCeJ’I U HeCKOJlbKO B3~JISI~OB y &it. 
lIeaH IIpe~cTaBnfIIorcff 06 OrIpeneJIeHsRx ero B 
MaTeMaTHKe, nTO6bl BhlRCHWTb el?O l-IOHRTUe 0 YUCJle. 
yllOTpe6JIeHkieM aKCWOM~TH~eCKOr0 MeTOJJa, neaH0 
XOTeJl C,JJeJWTb MaTeMEtTH~eCKyKI TeOpkiKl RCHee, 
ToYHee, H neme ywTbcx. O6HitipyWiBaeTCff TaKle 
HeCKOJ-IbKO l-IpHVHH 3arIeM OH He l-IpHHHMan COBpe- 
MeHHhlX “@HJIOCO@Hti” JIOrHIJH3Ma H @OpMaJlHsMa, 
aOKa3blBaSI, TaKHM 06pa30M, rIT0 OH HHKOrHa He 
CTapaJICsI 06OCHOBaTb MaTeMaTHKy HH Ha geIA KpOMe 
Ol-IhlTa y HaC MaTepHaJIbHOrO MHpa. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1891, two years after the publication of his now famous 
postulates for the natural rnmbers, Giuseppe Peano published, in 
the journal founded by him that year, an article with the title 
"Sul concetto di numero" ["On the concept of number"] [Peano 
1959, 80-1091. [l] In it he simplified his system by elimina- 
ting the undefined term symbolized by =, and the axioms relating 
to it. This system then consisted of three undefined terms: 
N (number), 1 (one), and a+ (the successor of a, where a is a 
number). The five axioms were [Peano 1958, 841: 
(1) 1 E N 
(2) + E N\N 
(3) a,bEN.a+=b+:l?.a=b 
(4) 1 - E N+ 
(5) s~K.l~s.s+3s :3.N3s 
These may be read [Peano 1958, 851 [2]: 
(1) One is a number. 
(2) The sign + placed after a number produces a number. 
(3) If a and b are two numbers, and if their successors 
are equal, then they are also equal. 
(4) One is not the successor of any number. 
(5) If s is a class containing one, and if the class made 
up of the successors of s is contained in s, then 
every number is contained in the class s. 
These postulates were not further reduced in number, although 
their form was changed, due to modifications in Peano's notation. 
Because Peano was able to build all of arithmetic on the 
basis of this set of axioms, his work in this field has become 
justly famous. (Evidence of continued interest in Peano's ideas 
is shown by the recent translation of "Sul concetto di numero" 
into Japanese [Peano 19691.) It is therefore of interest to 
know just what his conception of number was at that time and 
whether it later changed. His ideas did indeed evolve in this 
regard, and even in 1891 he was not as explicit as one would like, 
so that it is difficult to say exactly what his views were at 
any one moment. In the present article two lines of development 
in his work will be traced -- his technical presentation of the 
real number system and his repeated discussion of definitions in 
mathematics -- in the hope of exhibiting some constant factors 
in his mathematical thought and philosophical commitment. Fur- 
ther, although Peano's derivation of the laws of arithmetic from 
his postulates for the natural numbers has been called "superb" 
[Birkhoff 1973, 7691, I believe there still exist misconceptions 
about the manner in which the various types of numbers were 
introduced by him, misconceptions that may be cleared up by this 
presentation. 
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Peano first presented his postulates for the natural numbers 
in 1889 in Arithmetices principia , nova method0 exposita [Peano 
1958, 20-55; English translation in Peano 1973, 101-1341. With 
the simplification of 1891 he was able to prove that the five 
postulates were mutually independent (of which he was “morally 
certain” in 1889, because of their substantial agreement with 
Dedekind’s analysis in was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? 
[Dedekind 18881, a work that Peano read just as his own was going 
to press). In 1891 Peano also constructed a more complete system 
than in 1889, for although he often claimed to have been the 
first, in Arithmetices principia, to develop a complete system 
in symbols (the nova method0 of the title), in fact negative 
numbers were not defined there, rather only positive integers, 
positive rationals, and positive reals -- and few operations 
were defined for these. In later developments, the various 
classes of numbers were defined in the order: natural numbers N, 
integers n, positive rationals R, rationals r, positive reals 9, 
reals Q. Each of these will be treated separately. 
2. Development of the Real Number System 
2.1 Natural numbers N 
In 1889 and 1891 the sequence of natural numbers began with 
1, and the set of natural numbers was designated by N. This was 
modified in 1898 [Peano 1959, 2161 so that the sequence began 
with 0, the set being designated by No. The set of five postu- 
lates for N, 1, a + 1 (or 0, No, a+) was increased to six in 1901 
with the addition of: No E Cls, i.e. the natural numbers form a 
class. With the addition of this last, the postulates have re- 
ceived their final form, as follows (where a + 1 is identified 
with a+) [Peano 1901, 41-431: 
(0) No E Cls 
(1) 0 E No 
(2) 
(3) 
a E No . 3 . a+ E No 
(4) 
SEClS.oES :XES.3x.~+E~ :3.No3s 
a,b-EN,,.a+l=b+1.3.a=b 
(5) a E No . 3 . a + 1 - = 0 
The change to No from N (or Nl as it was now designated) 
brought other changes with it. For example, in 1891 (as already 
in 1889) addition of natural numbers was defined by the single 
equation: a + {b f 1) = (a + b) + 1. (This is to be understood, 
as Peano explained, in the sense that if a and b are numbers and 
the right hand member of the equation has meaning, but the left 
has to this point been undefined, then the expression on the 
left has the meaning of the expression on the right.) By the 
mathematical induction postulate, addition is then defined for 
all pairs of natural numbers. In 1898 the recursive definition 
of addition required two equations’: a + 0 = a, a + (b+) = (a + b)+. 
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(This definition was early criticized by K. Grandjot and others, 
who believed that these equations should be taken as postulates. 
Peano has been ably defended against these criticisms by Ugo 
Cassina [ 1961, 291-2981 . The remarks of later critics, such as 
J. van Heijenoort [1967, 831 have faulted this as part of Peano’s 
overall lack of a deductive scheme. These criticisms are more 
to the point, although Peano’s pioneer role in the use of recur- 
sive definitions should be emphasized.) 
2.2 Integers n 
With the natural numbers available, it is a relatively 
simple matter to define the integers and rational numbers in 
terms of ordered pairs. W.O. Quine, for example, writes [Quine 
1963, 1201: 
Another way would be to take 2/3 as the class of all 
pairs (.,3), (4,6), (6,9), etc.; this would mean defining 
x/y in generai as 
1 (&W) :z,w 6 N.x*w=z*yl. 
Such was Peano's version (1901). 
But such was, in fact, not Peano’s version. Neither for 
rationals nor for integers did he use ordered pairs. Rather, in 
each case these were defined as operations (or somewhat ambigu- 
ously as result of operations). In 1891, after defining a- as 
the operation inverse to a, he wrote [Peano 1959, 941: 
The combination of the sign of the inverse - and of the 
positive number b is what is called negative number. Hence 
the sign -5 has the meaning "invert, and then repeat five 
times." Thus, if xp indicates "the father of x," the 
expression xp-2 means "the son of the son of x"; and if x 
is a [natural] number, x+-5 means "that which is obtained 
by carrying out the operation inverse to successor of x 
five times" or "the number preceding x by five places." We 
shall have no need to introduce any new symbol to indicate 
"negative number," since the notation -N is sufficient. 
This is then followed by the definition: n = N U 0 U -N. 
(In which, as Cassina has observed [Peano 1959, 941, the symbol 
0 stands for 10, i.e. the set composed of the single element 0. 
This lapse is surprising here, since Peano uses the symbol 1, 
introduced the previous year [Peano 1957, 1301, later in this 
same article.) 
In 1898 (the next time he treated negative numbers), Peano 
commented more.explicitly on this way of introducing negative 
numbers without, however, 
his definition. 
removing the ambiguities inherent in 
He wrote [Peano 1959, 2271: 
P-7. 'Let a be a [natural] number; then -a is an operation 
that, applied to a number not less than a, produces a 
number.' 
This is only different in form from p-2. It may be 
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compared with P015.4, which says that +a, i.e. the opera- 
tion + repeated a times, is an N&No [i.e. a function that 
maps No into No]. 
The symbols +No and -No (P024) correspond, more or 
less, to the words 'positive numbers' and 'negative num- 
bers'; they appear as operations J. The symbol +a is 
equivalent to the expression 'add a' and -a means 'subtract 
a'. Following common usage, however, we call these 
operations 'whole numbers' (PO30) and by definitions P025, 
037, and 039.1, we have the formal coincidence of the 
numbers No and the positive numbers +No. 
In an article commenting on this section of the Formulaire, he 
wrote [Peano 1959, 2431: 
The so-called negative numbers and fractions are 
defined as the operations of subtraction and division. 
They thus go back to remotest antiquity, and well repre- 
sent the use that we make of them; the resulting theory 
is very simple. They are considered this way in a 
number of texts, in a more or less clear manner. 
If all this seems inadequate as definition, Peano does at 
least give a definition of the equality of two integers [Peano 
1959, 2271 : 
Po31. 'Two whole numbers x and y are equal, by 
definition, when for each positive number u, we have 
u + x = u + y, so long as these operations are possible 
on positive numbers.' 
031. x,y in. 3 :.x=y .= : 
ueNo.u+x,u+y~No. Du.u+x=u+y 
Df. 
The above explanations were repeated the following year, with 
the additional comment [Peano 1899, 381: “This manner of consi- 
dering positive and negative numbers is found more or less 
clearly in several authors,” and Peano quotes from Maclaurin and 
Cauchy . This is again repeated in the 1901 Formulaire de 
Mathgmatiques [Peano 1901, 491, but the explanation is greatly 
reduced in the last two editions of the Formulaire [Peano 1903, 
Peano 19081. Integers continued, however, to be defined as 
operations, and this process was continued in the case of rational 
numbers. 
2.3 Positive Rationals R 
Peano defined positive rational numbers in 1889 as follows 
[Peano 1958, 46; Peano 1973, 1261: 
R= :: [x E] :. p,q E N, ; = x :- =p q A 
I 
This may be read: R is the non-empty set of all x such that p 
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E and q are positive integers and x = Q . But what is something 
of the form 
it 
? This has not been directly defined, but Peano 
did define t e operation of the "ratio" e on a positive integer 
as: m,p,q E N . 3 . m(E) = mp/q. This %ust be understood in 
the sense that, if mp/qqhas meaning for some m,p,q the m& has 
the same meaning. But again, what is mp/q? This symboli m was -9 
previously defined by: 
a,b E N . 3 . b/a = Nix ~]fxa = b). 
This may be read: If a and b are positive integers, then b/a is 
that positive integer that when multiplied by a equals b. Thus 
m( ) $ is a positive integer. 
This ambiguous state of affairs was clarified only slightly 
in "Sul concetto di numero" where, after defining p/q only if 
p is a multiple of q, Peano notes that if m and p are integers 
and q is a positive integer (or at least not a), then m x (p/q) 
= fm x PI/a. Then he comments that if p is not a multiple of q, 
the expression m x (p/q) has no meaning. The expression 
(m x p)/q may, however, have meaning [i.e. if m x p is a multiple 
of al - In this case he simply proposed to define m x (p/q) as 
(m x PI/q. This still leaves open the question of whether he is 
thinking in this case of p/q merely as an ordered pair. I believe 
the most likely explanation is given in his next treatment of 
this subject, in 1898 [Peano 1898, 161 and repeated the following 
year [Peano 1899, 431, in which he gives the definition: 
R=x ' 3 (a;b) 3 [a,b E N1 . x = (xb)(/a) Df. 
His understanding of this is explained by the comment [Peano 1899, 
421: 
According to ordinary language, b/a precedes the number, 
or magnitude, on which one operates, and means 'divide by 
a and multiply by b'. E.g., '3/5 of 15 francs' means 
'that which is obtained by dividing 15 francs by 5 and 
multiplying the result by 3'. Rut we prefer to give to 
b/a, which follows the number on which one operates, the 
meaning 'multiply by b and divide by a', in order to make 
the operation possible in a larger number of cases. 
It seems clear from this that Peano was already thinking of a 
rational number as a (double) operation, and he confirmed this 
explicitly in 1901, in a footnote added to the publication of 
the paper he read at the International Congress of Philosophy in 
Paris (1900) [Peano 1958, 3671: 
Now, the fraction a/b is introduced 'by abstraction' 
[by others]. They have no equality of the form: 
a/b = expression composed of the preceding ideas), 
but they give only a nominal definition of the relation 
a/b = c/d. 
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We prefer to consider a/b as representing the composite 
operation xa/b, i.e. 'multiply by a and divide by b'. 
The two operators a/b and c/d are equal whenever, applied 
to the same number (one that makes the two operations 
possible), they give equal results.... 
One also finds this way of considering fractions as 
operators in M&ay, Leqons sur 1’Analyse InfinitCsimale 
(1894), p. 2, and already published by him in Nouvelles 
Annales de Mathdmatiques (1889), p. 421. This idea is 
the most natural. 
Peano did not, however, insist on being followed in this way 
of defining rationals. Indeed, with regard to those, just men- 
tioned, who defined the equality a/b = c/d and so introduced the 
rationals “by abstraction”, he wrote in 1902 [Peano 1902, 641: 
“The choice of one or the other of the possible definitions to 
be the actual definition depends on reasons of convenience.” 
2.4 Rationals r 
Peano did not define the set of rational numbers in 
drithmetices principia (1889), and in “Sul concetto di numero” 
(1891) there is only the abbreviated definition: R = N/N; r =n/N. 
This follows the introduction of positive rationals, and the 
first half of this is meant as a definition of the symbol R. 
However one understands R, then, r is to be understood similarly, 
replacing N in the “numberator” by n. This article contains no 
development of the rationals. This definition of r is repeated 
in all editions of the Formulaire de Math&atiques from 1898 
on, except in the last edition (1908), where it is given as a 
“possible.definition” and I is defined by: r = +R u -R u I 0 
(which was given as a possible definition in 1901 and and 1903, 
and as the definition in the dritmetica generale e algebra 
elementare of 1902.) 
2.5 Positive real numbers Q 
Peano defined the set of positive real numbers in 
dri thmetices principia by: 
Q=[xe](a~KR:a-= A:R3>Ta.-= A:Ta=x.'.-=A). 
This may be read: Q is the non-empty set of all x such that x 
is a least upper bound of a non-empty set of positive rational 
numbers and there are rational numbers larger than this least 
upper bound. Thus, a positive real number is a “least upper 
bound”, which Peano had just introduced without a definition! 
He merely said [Peano 1958, 49,; Peano 1973, 1281: 
If a c KR [i.e. a is a set of positive rational numbers], 
the symbol Ta is read upper boundary or upper limit of 
the class a [i.e., least upper bound]. We shall define 
only a few relations and operations on this new entity. 
394 H.C. Kennedy HMl 
[In fact, he defines only the relations x< Ta, x = Ta, 
x > Ta, for x E R.] 
This time the explanation of his views came only a decade 
later in 1899 in “Sui numeri irrazionali”, in which he reviews 
the above definition, transcribing it into his current symbolism. 
He then discusses the method of introducing irrationals of no 
less than eleven authors, quot.ing the following passage of Dede- 
kind with especial approval [Peano 1959, 2641: 
Jedesmal nun, wenn ein Schnitt (Al, AZ) vosliegt, 
welcher durch keine rationale Zahl hervorgebracht wird, 
so erschaffen wir eine neue, eine irrationale Zahl a, 
welche wir als durch diesen Schnitt (Al, AZ) vollstlndig 
definiert ansehen. 
Peano notes : “In this ‘erschaffen’ (create) is precisely 
indicated that the real number is considered as an entity differ- 
ent from section, or segment.” 
Near the end of the article, Peano gives four statements, 
which include: 
(a) Every class of (rational) numbers, all less than a 
given number, has a real number as least upper bound. 
(c) Every sequence (of rationals) that satisfies the 
criterion of convergence, effectively converges toward 
a limit. 
He concludes the article by commenting on these statements 
[Peano 1959, 2671: 
These propositions, all true, even if one suppresses 
the condition 'of ration&s4 written between parentheses, 
are easily deduced one from the other. One of them may 
be transformed into the definition of irrationals. Our 
authors' opinions vary on this choice. 
In the applications, especially to analysis, proposition 
(a) is used more often than (c). Indeed, in most texts, 
to recognize the convergence of series, or of integrals, 
etc., almost constant use is made of (c). Hence the opi- 
nion of Cantor [Mathematische Annalen 21 (18831, 5671, 
is justified, that his method is 'die einfachste und natiir- 
lichste von allen' and speaking of that of Dedekind, he 
says that 'die Zahlen in der Analysis niemals in der Form 
von "Schnitten" darbieten, in welche sie erst mit grosser 
Kunst und Umstkindlichkeit gebracht werden miissen.' 
But in several of my works I have shown that the defini- 
tion of integral depends on the sole concept of least 
upper bound, and not on that of the limit toward which a 
function converges. Similarly, in geometrical applications 
we define, for example, the length of an arc of a curve 
as the least upper bound of the lengths of the inscribed 
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polygons, rather than as the limit toward which their 
lengths converge (see EnzyclopPdie der Mathematischen 
Wissenschaften, p. 72). Thus the most appropriate form 
of the principle and the one that is applied continually 
in analysis appears to me to be (a), to which the defini- 
tion of the irrational can therefore be directly attached. 
2.6 Real numbers q 
Negative real numbers were not defined by Peano in 
Arithmetices principia (1889). In “Sul concetto di numero (1891) 
the set of real numbers q was defined directly, without first 
defining Q, as [Peano 1959, 1081: 
q = (l'Kr)(- I a)(- 1 - ") 
“Real numbers are the least upper bounds of the classes of 
rational numbers, excluding +OJ and --oD.” This definition arises 
as an alternative to Dedekind’s “cut,” which Peano had just 
analysed, since, he says: 
. ..instead of considering both classes A1 and AZ, it is 
sufficient, as Dedekind has already observed, to consider 
only the first, A 1, seeing that the other, AZ, is the set 
of rational numbers not in A 
1' 
This least upper bound; 1'A where A is a set of rational numbers, 
is to be distinguished from the set A. In this regard Peano 
criticized Pasch for confusing the two, remarking [Peano 1959, 
1071: 
Hence, to remove this difficulty it is necessary to 
make correspond to every segment A a new entity, that I 
shall indicate by 1'A (least upper bound of A); and to 
indicate the relation in question one writes 1'A = a. 
Real numbers are therefore least upper bounds of segments. 
The difficulty that Peano is trying to avoid occurs, of course, 
in the case where the least upper bound of a set A is rational. 
Then the identification of the set A with its real (in this case 
rational) least upper bound a requires a = A, whereas the appro- 
priate relation is a EA. 
Peano repeated the above definition of reals in 1899, but 
that same year in the Formulaire de Mathgmatiques, after having 
introduced the positive reals 0, he gave the definition: 
q=Q U - Q u I 0, and this definition was repeated in all 
later editions of the Formulaire. 
3. Mathematical Definitions 
We have just surveyed Peano’s development of the real number 
system, starting from the natural numbers. Let us now return to 
the natural numbers to ask: To what extent did Peano believe 
the postulates defined the natural numbers? Peano himself raised 
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the question of the possibility of defining the natural numbers 
in “Sul concetto di numero. ” After stating the five “primitive 
propositions” and some “immediate consequences ,” he observed 
[Peano 1959, 84-851: 
The first numbers presented , with which we form all the 
others, are the positive integers. And the first question 
is: Can we define one, number, sum of two numbers? The 
connnon, Euclidean, definition of number, 'number is the 
collection of serveral units', may serve as a clarification, 
but is not satisfactory as a definition. Indeed, very 
young children use the words one, two, three, etc. They 
later adopt the word number, and only much later does the 
word collection appear in their vocabulary. Indeed, philo- 
logy teaches that these words appear in this same order 
in the development of the Indo-European languages. Hence, 
from the practical side, the question appears to me to be 
settled, or rather, there is no need for the teacher to 
give any definition of number, seeing that this idea is 
very clear to the pupils, and any definition would only 
have the effect of confusing them. The majority of authors 
also share this opinion. 
From the theoretical side, to decide the question of 
the definition of number, one should be told first what 
ideas he may use. Here we suppose known only the ideas 
represented by the signs n (and), v (or), - (not), 
E (is), etc., which have been treated in the preceding 
note. Therefore, number cannot be defined, since it is 
evident that however these words are combined among them- 
selves, we can never have an expression equivalent to 
number. If number cannot be defined, however, we can 
still state those properties from which the many other 
well known properties of the numbers are derived. 
The concepts, then, that we do not define are.those 
of number N, of one 1, and of successor of a number a, 
which we indicate for the momen? by a+. These concepts 
may not be obtained by deduction; it is necessary to 
obtain them by induction (abstraction). The successor of 
a is here indicated by a+, instead of the customary a + 1, 
and this is done so as to indicate by a single sign, +, 
the fundamental operation 'successor of'. Besides, in 
the following sections, having defined the sum a + b of 
two numbers, we shall see that a + 1 has precisely the 
value of a+, i.e. the successor of a, and thus we return 
to the customary notation. 
A bit further on he adds [Peano 1959, 881: 
Between the preceding and what Bedekind says there is 
an apparent contradiction that should immediately be 
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pointed out. Here, number is not defined, but its prin- 
cipal properties are stated. Instead, Dzdekind defines 
number as precisely that which satisfies the preceding 
conditions. Evidently, the two coincide. 
With regard to this quotation, two remarks may be made. First, 
we should notice .that Peano answers his questions from two view- 
points: didactic and theoretical. His “theoretical” view is 
of more interest here, but we must always realize that it was 
colored by his views on teaching, and seldom did he make the 
distinction so clearly as here. Indeed, in his later years he 
discussed the didactic question more often. Second, Peano’s 
notion of definition in mathematics varied a great deal, and his 
answers must be interpreted in the light of his acceptance of 
the various types of definitions at the time. In 1891 his view 
was rather narrow. It is clear that he is asking for a nominal 
definition of the form 
x = (expression composed of preceding symbols). 
This he has not given for the natural numbers, and he asserts its 
relative impossibility. Yet, his acceptance of Dedekind’s use 
of the term “definition” (“Evidently the two coincide”) is 
probably more than just conciliatory, for he shortly came closer 
to what he here described as Dedekind’s position. 
But what did Peano mean when he said that an idea was obtained 
“by abstraction”? He next discussed this in 1894 [Peano 1958, 
167-1681: 
There are some ideas obtained by abstraction and with 
which the mathematical sciences are constantly being en- 
riched that cannot be defined in the form stated. Let u 
be an object; by abstraction, one deduces a new object 
h. We cannot form an equality 
@I = known expression, 
for $u is an object of a nature different from all those 
that we have considered up to the present. Rather, we 
define the equality $u = $v by setting 
h u,v * 3 :4u = 4v . = . Pu,v Def. 
where hulv is the hypothesis on the objects u and v. Thus 
4u = 4v means the same as pu,v , which is a condition, or 
relation, between u and v, having a previously known mean- 
ing. This relation must satisfy the three conditions of 
equality that follow: [Here Peano describes the reflexive, 
symmetric, and transitive properties of an equivalence 
relation.]... 
The object indicated by $JU is therefore what one obtains 
by considering in u all and only those properties that it 
has in common with the other objects v such that $u = $v. 
Peano gives as an example of this Euclid’s definition of 
ratio of two magnitudes in Book V of the Elements. He is still 
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unwilling to admit that objects are truly defined “by abstrac- 
tion,” but he moved a bit closer to this view in his statement 
near the end of this article [Peano 1958, 1751: 
Whatever the manner of reasoning, if a science does not 
contain primitive ideas, as happens in every advanced 
theory, one can define and prove everything in it. But if 
the science touches its very elements, and if there are 
ideas that cannot be defined, one will also find proposi- 
tions that cannot be proved , and from which all the others 
follow. We shall call these primitive propositions, ab- 
breviated by Pp; they are also called axioms, postulates, 
and sometimes hypotheses, experimental laws, etc. These 
propositions determine or, if you like, define the primi- 
tive ideas that have not been given a direct definition. 
In 1897 Peano was still insisting on this form of definition 
[Peano 1958, 2081: 
By symbolic definition of a new symbol x we understand 
the convention of calling x a group of symbols already 
having a known meaning; and we indicate this by 
x=a Def. 
In 1898, with regard to the postulates for the natural numbers, 
he wrote [Peano 1959, 2171: 
Des idles primitives sont d&terminees par les 5 
propositions primitives 002 desquelles d&oulent toutes 
les P[ropositions] de l'Arithm&tique. 
Peano meant that the postulates “determine” the natural numbers 
to the extent that the theorems of arithmetic follow. He was 
aware from the beginning that they do not uniquely characterize 
the natural numbers, as he explicitly pointed out in “Sul concetto 
di numero” [Peano 1959, 871: 
These propositions express the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that the entities of a system can be put into 
one-to-one correspondence with the series of natural 
numbers. 
In 1898, again with regard to the postulates for the natural 
numbers, he wrote [Peano 1959, 2431: 
The analysis of the ideas of arithmetic contained in 
Fs§2 [i.e. the Formulaire of 18981 is the only one in 
existence today. To this group of propositions 002-l-5, 
which may be called a definition of the positive integers, 
using the word definition in a wider sense than that given 
in F281 P7 [i.e. in the Formulaire of 1897, as quoted 
above], the nearest work is that of Dedekind of 1888.... 
BY 1899 Peano was willing to admit [Peano 1959, 2611: “The 
word ‘definition’. even books of mathematics, has several 
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meanings. ” He went on to say: 
Prof. C. Burali-Forti, in his text Logica Matematica, 
Milan, 1898, pp. 120-148, has classified the definitions 
that are met in the theories already expressed in ideo- 
graphic symbols, distinguishing them by the names : 
nominal definition, definition by induction, by abstrac- 
tion, etc. [The “etc.” seems superfluous, since Burali- 
Forti only discusses the three types mentioned.] Of 
these various types of definitions, the nominal appears 
to be the most satisfactory. Many definitions of the 
other types contained in the early works of mathematical 
logic could be transformed into nominal definitions. Of 
definitions by abstraction , in P2N2 (Arithmetic) [i.e. 
the Formulaire of 18981 use is made only once, in P210.1, 
to define the cardinal number, or power, of a set. 
Since Peano says that he used definition by abstraction only 
once in the Fbrmulaire of 1898, we must understand that he is 
using the term “definition by abstraction” as a technical term, 
since the expression “by abstraction” is used in that book in 
referring to the postulates for the natural numbers, presumably 
used in a wider sense. After noting that there are an infinity 
of systems that satisfy the postulates, he wrote [Peano 1959, 
2181: 
Tous les syst&mes qui satisfont aux 5 Pp sont en 
correspondence r&iproque avec les nombres. Le nombre, 
Nor est ce qu'on obtient par abstraction de tous ces sys- 
Gmes; autrement dit, le nombre No est le systi?me qui a 
toutes et se&es fes propri&& Qnoncdes par les 5 P 
primitives . 
This sentence, slightly altered, was repeated in the Formulaire 
of 1899, of 1901, and of 1903, but was omitted from the final 
edition of 1908. 
By 1900 the problem of what constitutes a definition in 
mathematics had become of greater interest to Peano, and he made 
this the subject of his talk at the International Congress of 
Philosophy in Paris that summer. There he said [Peano 1958, 
3621: 
Une definition est r&ductible B une &alit&, dont un 
membre (le premier) est le nom qu'on dgfinit, et l'autre 
en exprime la valeur. Example : 
(d&iv6 d'une fonction) = (limite du rapport des 
accroissement de la fonction 
et de la variable.) 
En cons&quence, un proposition qui n'est pas une Bgalit6 
ne pourra pas Btre une definition. 
The problem posed by Peano does not concern the form that a 
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definition must have -- this he consistently affirms must be an 
equality -- but rather is the question of which equalities are 
(or could be) taken as definitions. Of special interest, because 
of its immediate influence, is the example o = a - a, as an 
equality that may not be taken as a definition of zero. First 
of all, according to Peano, it is incomplete, since we are not 
told what value to give to the letter a. Second, even if we say: 
“Let a be a number; then 0 = a - a,” the equality is still not 
homogeneous, ‘for the first member is the constant symbol &while 
the second is a function of the variable letter a. Peano then 
shows how to properly phrase the definition [Peano 1959, 3661: 
La proposition: 
0 = (la valeur constante de l'expression a - a, 
quel que soit le nombre a) 
est une 6galitb homogsne, car, bien que dans le second mem- 
bre figure la lettre a, elle n'y figure qu'en apparence, 
puisque la valeur de ce second membre n'est pas une fonc- 
tion de a. Cette proposition est une definition possible. 
After the talk, Schrijder objected that Peano’s condition of 
homogeneity was too restrictive, but Peano (backed up by his 
disciple Alessandro Padoa) defended it. Ivor Grattan-Guinness 
has discovered from manuscript sources (to be described in detail 
in an article in preparation by him) that is was their discussion 
on this topic that convinced Bertrand Russell of Peano’s supe- 
riority over Schrllder. 
In 1901, as part of a projected dictionary of mathematics, 
Peano wrote a brief dictionary of mathematical logic. There he 
again insisted on the “equality” form of a definition, but we 
find under the heading “abstraction” the following [Peano 1958, 
3731: 
In mathematical logic, what is called "definition by 
abstraction" is the definition of a function 4x, having 
the form: 
l$x = $y . = . (expression composed of the preceding 
symbols), 
that is, the isolated symbol 4x is not defined, but only 
the equality 4x = $y. 
At this time, although Peano recognized definitions by abstrac- 
tion as valid, he felt that their use should be avoided where 
possible. This is shown in a letter of May 1902 to L. Gerard, 
editor of the Bulletin des sciences math&mtiques et physiques, 
and published in that journal the following month. After recal- 
ling. that Burali-Forti had classified the definitions used in 
mathematics and had called “definition of the first type” those 
of the form [Peano 1959, 3711: 
x=a &f. 
oif x est le signe simple qu'on definit, et a est un 
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groupement des signes connus. Le.Signe = accompagn6 de 
Df signifie <<est &al par ddfinition Z+ ou <<nous 
norrmOllS>>, 
he gives several examples of definitions by abstraction, conclud- 
ing with [Peano 1959, 3721: 
plusieurs analystes introduisent les nombres rationnels 
par abstraction, en posant 
a,b,c,d E (nombres naturels) . 3 :a/b = c/d . = . ad = bc, 
mais cela n'est pas n&essaire , car on peut en donner une 
Df de premike espke. 
D'une fa$on analogue, notre Dfl est une Df par'abstrac- 
Con, car elle dgfinit une &alite'. 
Or, il est bon de remarquer qu'on peut ddfinir les 
nombres imaginaires par des Df de premizre esp&&, et qu'il 
n’est pas nkessaire de recourir ii des Df par abstraction. 
Peano continued to be interested in the question of definitions 
in mathematics (and in the last year of his life assigned this 
as a thesis topic to the young Ludovico Geymonat, now Professor 
of the Philosophy of Science at the University of Milan, Italy), 
but his next publication on thi- D topic was not until 1911 and 
by that time he had ceased to be the innovator in this field, 
and although he was still capable of incisive comments, he was 
usually content to describe the views of others. This resulted 
from two major events, both dating from 1903. One was the intro- 
duction of Latin0 sine flexione as an international. auxiliary 
language. The following years saw his almost complete dedication 
to the international auxiliary language movement, confirmed by 
his election in 1908 to the directorship of the Academia pro 
Interlingua, a position he held until his death in 1932. 
The second event of 1903 that influenced Peano was the publi- 
cation of Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Mathematics, which, 
as Peano wrote to Russell [Kennedy 1974, 311, “marked an epoch 
in the field of philosophy of mathematics.” He had already 
written Russell in 1901 [Kennedy 1974?]: 
Permettez-moi de me fgliciter avec vous de la facilit& 
et de la pr&ision avec lequelles vous maniez les symboles 
de Logique. 
Now he was content to let Russell take over leadership in this 
field, and in 1910 could only write him [Kennedy 1974?]: 
Je vous remercie du livre Principia Mathematics, que 
je me propose de lire avec attention. Maintenant, mes 
heures libres de l'&ole sont occupges dans la question 
de l'Interlingua,.... 
Peano did not, however, accept everything that Russell was 
doing. In particular, he rejected Russell’s “class of classes” 
definition of cardinal number, published by Russell in Peano’s 
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journal in July 1901 [Russell 1901, 1211. Curiously, Peano’s 
rejection was published several months earlier in Formulaire de 
math&natiques, vol. 3, dated 1 January 1901. There Peano defined 
the cardinal number of a set a, symbolized by Num a, “by abstrac- 
tion,” adding [Peano 1901, 701: “mais on ne peut pas identifier 
Num a avec la Cls de Cls consideree, car ces objets ont des 
propri&& diff6rentes.” Although this publication preceded 
that of Russell, Peano would have had Russell’s manuscript since 
October 1900 and so was probably prompted by it to consider the 
“class of classes” definition. At any rate, Russell did not 
alter his manuscript, but commented in Principles of Mathematics 
[Russel 1903, section 1111: “He does not tell us what these 
properties are, and for my part I am unable to discover them.” 
Significantly, however, Peano does identify the finite cardinal 
numbers with the natural numbers. Indeed, he had already done 
this in “Sul concetto di numero” where, although Peano was 
aware that the postulates do not characterize the concept of 
natural numbers, nevertheless, as Ugo Cassina has noted [letter 
to the author dated 4 June 19611, “the way in which he attacks 
the problem of numeration [in Peano 1959, 1001, i.e., his induc- 
tive definition of ‘number of objects of a [finite] class’ 
results in giving to the primitive entities 0, No, + (or ‘sue’) 
the intuitive meaning .‘I 
What, then, was Peano’s objection to the “class of classes” 
definition? Most probably it was the artificiality of this 
concept as opposed to what Peano saw as the “natural” concept of 
number. Consider, for example, the passage of 1906 [Peano 1957, 
3431: 
That is, we have deduced theorems identical to the 
postulates of arithmetic. Therefore, for the sumbols of 
arithmetic 0, No, +, there exists an interpretation that 
satisfies the system of postulates. Thus it has been 
proved (if proof were necessary), that the postulates of 
arithmetic, which the collaborators of the Formulaire 
have shown to be necessary and sufficient, do not involve 
a self-contradiction. 
Other examples of entities that satisfy the system of 
postulates have been given by Burali-Forti and by Izlssell. 
But a proof that a system of postulates of arithmetic, or 
of geometry, does not involve a self-contradiction is not, 
I think, necessary. For we do not create postulates at 
will, but we assume as postulates the simplest statements 
that, either written in an explicit way or implicitly, are 
in every treatise of arithmetic or of geometry. Our 
analysis of the principles of these sciences is the reduc- 
tion of the ordinary statements to a necessary and suffi- 
cient minimum. Systems of postulates of arithmetic and of 
geometry are satisfied by the ideas of number and point 
that every writer of arithmetic and geometry has. 
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With the publication of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia 
Ma thematica, Peano seems willing to concede to them the “class of 
classes” definition of number. He wrote in 1913 in his review 
of Vol. 1 [Peano 1958, 397-3981: 
Page 363 begins the treatment of cardinal numbers. The 
authors eliminate definitions by abstraction. In many 
cases mathematicians introduce a new entity $x, not by a 
definition of the form 
Qx = expression composed of x and known symbols, 
but they define only the equality: 
Qx = @y . = . relation px,y composed of x,y, and known 
elements 
The authors prove that definitions by abstraction can be 
reduced to nominal definitions; it suffices to set 
x = y 3 (PXIYL 
Peano’s acceptance of all this, however, is not complete, and in 
1915 he again definds definitions by abstraction in an article 
with the title “Le definizioni per astrazione” [Peano 1958, 402- 
4161. Perhaps he felt, in some way, the necessity of defending 
what was his, for although the recognition of the importance of 
the procedure that leads to it goes back at least to H. Grass- 
mann’s Ausdehnungslehre of 1844, nevertheless it was Peano who 
introduced the name “definition by abstraction” in 1894 [Peano 
1958, 1671. But his objections are on practical grounds; he 
seems to accept the logical validity of replacing definitions by 
abstraction by nominal definitions. In this same article there 
is an interesting comment apropos definitions by abstraction and 
the cardinal numbers (of Cantor). After noting that one says the 
cardinal numbers of two sets are the same if the sets can be put 
into a one-to-one correspondence, he concludes [Peano 1958, 4041: 
One thus defines the equality of two numbers, and not 
number itself; and this because this definition may be 
placed before arithmetic, and also because the number that 
results is not the finite number of arithmetic. 
It it not clear what distinction he intends here, since in 
the Formulaire he identified the finite cardinals with the natural 
numbers -- but perhaps he only means that some cardinqls are 
infinite. Peano next describes Padoa’s theory of equivalence 
relations (relations that are reflexive, symmetric, and transi- 
tive -- Padoa called them “egualiforme”) and concludes [Peano 
1958, 4131; “Between the two theories, definition by abstraction 
and equivalence, I see only a difference of language.” 
Finally, Peano comments on Russell’s practice of replacing 
definitions by abstraction by nominal definitions. But by 1915 
he does not want to oppose the authority of Russell, and he 
definds his neutrality. He wrote [Peano 1958, 4141: 
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The question of abstraction pertains to pure logic, and 
we can give non-mathematical examples. Are the following 
equations true or not? 
whiteness = white things, 
sickness = sick people, 
youth = young people, 
Italy = the Italians, 
justice = judges, police, jail. 
The theory of Russell answers in the affirmative. I, 
investing myself with the authority of Euclid (like a live 
ass covered with the hide of a dead lion), neither affirm 
nor deny. This identity is denied by the doctor who says 
'there are no sicknesses, but only sick people', as well as 
by the opposite theory that says 'I conquered the sickness 
and killed the sick person'. 
The question of definitions in mathematics continued to 
interest Peano, and he returned to this topic in 1921 in an arti- 
cle discussing the various types of definitions. He even included 
a discussion of “primitive ideas” and their use in setting up an 
axiom system [Peano 1958, 433; 1973, 2443: 
The fundamental properties of the primitive ideas are 
determined by the "primitive propositions", or the propo- 
sitions that are not proven , and from which are deduced 
all the other properties of the entities considered. The 
primitive propositions function in a certain fashion as 
definitions of the primitive ideas. 
With this last remark, we apparently have Peano’s complete 
acceptance of the Postulates for the Natural Numbers as a defini- 
tion, something he appeared reluctant to accept in 1891. Having 
in the meantime searched for another definition, and not finding 
it, he ends by adopting a naive axiomatic viewpoint, while still 
equivocating with the restriction “in a certain fashion.” 
4. Conclusion 
Peano made no pretense of being a philosopher and, indeed, 
denied competence in this field. Nevertheless several things 
stand out in his development of, and comment on, the real number 
system, as it has been traced above. Perhaps the most important 
aspect of his work in the foundations of mathematics is that he 
made no attempt to found mathematics on any prior discipline. 
In particular, he denied the validity of Russell’s reduction of 
mathematics to pure logic. Peano was concerned with reducing 
arithmetic, say, to the minimum number of undefined terms and 
axioms, from which all the rest could be defined and proved. For 
him the goal of the axiomatic method was to make the theory 
clearer, more precise, and easier to learn. 
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Peano saw mathematical logic as contributing to this goal. 
Already in 1894 he wrote Felix Klein [Peano 18941: 
Mathematical logic, with a very limited number of signs 
(actually seven, but further reducible), has succeeded in 
expressing all the logical relations imaginable among 
classes and propositions; or rather, the analysis of these 
relations has led to the use of these signs, with which 
everything can be expressed, even the most complicated 
relations that are expressed in ordinary language with 
fatigue and difficulty. But the advantage is not limited 
to simplifying the writing; its usefulness lies especially 
in the analysis of the ideas and reasoning that make up 
mathematics. 
As an example of this usefulness, he continues: 
I could cite many so-called theories that evaporate 
when translated into symbols; they exist only in appear- 
ance, by exchanging a new name for an old idea. I limit 
myself to mentioning that several parts of the theory of 
fields and moduli of Dedekind are merely propositions of 
logic, and as such are included in Part I of the Formulaire. 
It seems clear, too, that Peano was not a formalist, in the 
sense of Hilbert. This point has already been emphasized by his 
ardent disciple Ugo Cassina (1894-1964) [see Cassina 19611. 
Mathematics, then, has content and is not merely a game. In 1923 
Peano wrote [Peano 1923, 3831: 
Mathematics has a place between logic and the experimen- 
tal sciences. It is pure logic; all its propositions are 
of the form: 'If one supposes A, then B is true.' But 
these logical constructions must not be made for the mere 
pleasure of reasoning about them. The object studied by 
them is given by the experimental sciences; they must have 
a practical goal. 
Thus Peano believed that mathematics can, and must, be based on 
experience, as we have already seen above in his comment on 
consistency proofs of an axiom system. 
Many of Peano’s views on the concept of number were echoed 
in 1939, in an article that has recently been reprinted, by A.Ya. 
Khinchin (Ane~ca~-&@ RKOBJEBU~I XUMH 1894-1959). For example 
[Khinchin 1968, 31: 
The concept of number is distinguished from many other 
concepts of the school course by its primarity. This 
means that in the overwhelming majority of ways in which 
mathematics can be developed as a logical system, the idea 
of number belongs to the set of those concepts which are 
not defined in terms of other concepts, but together with 
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the axioms enter into the ranks of the initial data. It, 
means that mathematics does not contain within itself 
an answer to the question 'what is a number?' -- an 
answer,that is, which would consist of a definition of 
this concept in terms of concepts that had been introduced 
at an earlier stage; mathematics gives this answer in a 
different form, by listing the properties of a number as 
axioms. 
Further, I believe that Peano, with his great concern for the 
teaching of mathematics, would have approved Khinchin’s advice 
to the teacher whose pupil asked the question ‘what is a number?’ 
[Khinchin 1968, 41: 
Tell him that the question he has posed is one of the 
most difficult questions in the philosophy of science, one 
to which we are still far from having a complete answer; 
that a number, in the same way as any mathematical concept, 
is the reflection in our own consciousness of certain 
relations in the real world; but that the question, pre- 
cisely which relations of the world find their reflection 
in the concept of number, which relations are quantitative, 
is a deep and difficult philosophical problem; mathematics 
itself can only point out to those who study it what types 
of numbers there are , what are their properties, and how 
they can and should be manipulated. 
That Peano himself recognized the seriousness of this problem 
and was not misled by the facile “philosophical” solutions 
current in his lifetime (e.g. logicism and formalism) is confirmed 
by the conclusion of L. Geymonat with regard to the difficulty 
in determining Peano’s views. He wrote [Geymonat 1955, 62-631: 
If we must recognize this hesitation of Peano, it would 
nevertheless be superficial to attribute it to his incapa- 
city to detect the philosophical problem underlying the 
mathematical one. It seems to me more exact to recognize, 
on the contrary, the criti,cal depth of his position, 
inspired by a somewhat excessive caution. The slightly, 
but constantly, ironic tone with which he talked about 
philosophical discussions -- was it not perhaps the trench 
behind which he wished to defend himself from the tempta- 
tions of the rash theories of the 'philosophers'? 
NOTES 
1. Since for most readers the volumes of the Opere scelte 
[Peano 1957, 1958, 19.591 will be the most available source 
of Peano’s writings, I have given page references to them 
wherever possible. 
2. I have translated into English all quotations that were 
originally in Italian. 
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